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Various European Union (EU) regulatory bodies have championed the use of environmental 
markets as a key policy tool to achieve environmental protection either in lieu of, or in 
addition to, more traditional regulatory programmes. When these markets work properly, 
they have the capacity to provide enhanced levels of environmental quality and can operate 
as more efficient mechanisms for protecting natural resources that provide vital services to 
people. However, if regulatory safeguards are absent from the legal frameworks creating 
such markets, it is unlikely that the theoretical benefits of these arrangements will be 
realized. This article assesses whether a number of EU environmental markets meet design 
standards that guard against these risks. It concludes that despite recognition of the danger 
of market manipulation and outright fraud, to date regulators in the EU have largely 
responded to these risks largely in an ad hoc and incomplete fashion, rather than embedding 
the mechanisms for operational accountability into the regulatory frameworks that govern 
green trading arrangements. Finally, this article identifies and prescribes five essential 
pillars for market-based programmes for the environment that are necessary to provide 
operational safeguards. These include informational safeguards, transparency standards, 
rule of law safeguards, verifiable performance standards and financial fidelity rules. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
On 3 March 2016, the European Biodiesel Board (EBB) alerted European Union (EU) 
regulators about possible trade distortions and fraud in the biodiesel market perpetrated by 
Polish diesel traders
1
 in contravention of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED)
2
 and the 
Fuel Quality Directive (FQD).
3
 Key to the EU’s climate change and energy strategy, the RED 
and FQD put in place regulations that mandate an increasing amount of fuel from renewable 
sources, such as rapeseed, cooking oil and other waste products. In order to reduce carbon 
emissions from cars and lorries, one element of the RED requires that domestic traders blend 
diesel fuel with biofuel sourced from local renewable sources.
4
 Instead of blending rapeseed 
oil or other renewable sources with regular diesel to produce a biofuel, the EBB found that 
some Polish suppliers were attempting to meet the obligation to provide green fuel at home 
by simply adding extra diesel to the mix and reserving the fuel made from crops. It is 
believed that they then passed off regular diesel as the blended variety in the domestic market 
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as well as for export, thereby gaining payments for blended diesel where none had taken 
place.
5
 
 
The regulatory failure of the Polish biodiesel market is yet another example of systematic 
manipulation and fraud in a line of cases in the EU involving schemes designed to utilize 
markets for the provision of environmental services. More importantly, the case demonstrates 
the pressing need for comprehensive regulatory safeguards and accountability mechanisms in 
environmental markets because without these, it is likely that strategies for market-based 
interventions in favour of environmental protection will fall prey to fraud and manipulation. 
This is particularly important because since the 1970s, market-based interventions have 
formed a key part of EU regulatory programmes for the protection of the environment and 
natural resources.
6
 Whilst many of these programmes have produced successful initiatives, 
their achievements have to be appreciated in the context of widespread fraud that has 
hampered the operation of some key schemes such as the Polish case described above. 
 
This article is an analytical examination of instances of fraud and manipulation in EU 
environmental markets. It scrutinizes the problems using recent case studies and seeks to 
fashion regulatory solutions emerging from the complex nature of the trading regimes 
themselves as well as the sophisticated nature of the fraud and manipulation. 
 
Consequently, this article focuses on the role of markets in protecting ecosystem services – 
an area in which there is an urgent need for a clear and effective regulatory framework, 
because momentum for increased reliance on market-based interventions has grown. Drawing 
on experiences with environmental markets in the EU, the article analyses examples of past 
abuses to underscore the urgent need for the careful design of these market-based 
environmental regulatory programmes. More importantly, it uses the failures identified in 
these case studies to make the case for five operational safeguards that need to be 
incorporated into such market-based interventions if they are to offer protection against fraud 
and abuse whilst preserving the potential for cost effective environmental protection. These 
operational standards include informational safeguards, transparency standards, rule of law 
safeguards, verifiable performance standards and financial fidelity rules. To date, no EU 
market for ecosystem services systematically relies on each of these standards to protect the 
integrity of trading programmes. Used in combination, the operational safeguards advanced 
here could significantly increase the chances of realising the efficiency benefits of the 
operation of environmental markets whilst preventing behaviour that relegates environmental 
public policy goals to manipulative private gain. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS IN THE EU AND EXAMPLES OF PAST ABUSES 
 
EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS 
 
The EU has taken a leading role in the development of environmental markets. Perhaps the 
best known example is the EU emissions trading system (ETS),
7
 which has been in operation 
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since 2005. It is regarded as the first international trading system for carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions in the world.
8
 Since 1 January 2008, it has applied to the 27 EU Member States and 
to 3 members of the European Economic Area (EEA): Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
9
 
The EU ETS covers over 11,000 installations in the energy and industrial sectors, which are 
responsible for almost half of the EU’s CO2 emissions, and 40% of its total greenhouse gas 
emissions. An amendment to the EU ETS Directive, adopted in July 2008,
10
 agreed to bring 
the aviation sector into the system beginning in 2012.
11
 The ETS is a cap-and-trade system, 
which caps the overall level of emissions allowed. Within that limit, participants in the 
system are allowed to buy and sell permits, as they require. These permits are the trading 
‘currency’ at the heart of the system. A permit gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of 
CO2 or the equivalent amount of another greenhouse gas, and the cap on the total number of 
permits creates scarcity in the market and opportunities for trading. 
 
In addition to the ETS, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)12 and its related agri-
environmental measures (AEMs) provide mechanisms through which to regulate ecosystem 
service markets.
13
 Although the CAP is principally an agricultural framework, its AEMs 
provide incentives to encourage farmers to protect and enhance the environmental attributes 
of their farmland.
14
 Under these measures, farmers are paid in return for providing an 
environmental service. Service contracts are signed with a domestic public regulator and 
farmers are paid for the additional cost of implementing such commitments and for loss of 
income. The two main objectives are to reduce environmental risks and to preserve nature 
and cultivated landscapes. AEMs go beyond usual good farming practice
15
 – the standard 
legal obligations and levels of environmental care that each farmer routinely has to comply 
with, are compiled in ‘regional’ codes submitted by Member States to the European 
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Commission for approval. Some AEMs concern productive land management, such as input 
reduction, which includes reduction of fertilizers and plant protection products, crop rotation 
measures, organic farming, extensification of livestock, conversion of arable land to 
grassland, under-sowing, cover crops, farmed buffer strips, prevention of erosion and fire and 
rotation measures, and actions such as late mowing in areas of special biodiversity/natural 
interest.
16
 Also considered are measures that enhance genetic diversity, maintenance of 
existing sustainable and extensive systems, farmed landscapes, and water use reduction 
measures. Other AEMs concern non-productive land management, such as setting aside land, 
upkeep of abandoned farmland and woodland, and upkeep and maintenance of the 
countryside and landscape features. 
 
Environmental markets have also emerged in connection with the implementation of 
international environmental agreements to which the EU is a party. An excellent example of 
this type of market is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) developed as part of the 
Kyoto Protocol.
17
 Article 12 of the Protocol allows parties to receive credits for participation 
in projects certified on the basis of their capacity to produce ‘real, measurable, and long-term 
benefits to the mitigation of climate change’.18 Among the projects capable of meeting these 
requirements are renewable energy initiatives and carbon sequestration efforts. For example, 
developing countries could expand forests that sequester carbon as a means of generating 
credits. These credits could then be sold to developed countries to help the latter meet their 
greenhouse gas emission reduction obligations more efficiently than they could have done by 
pursuing emissions control or other technological solutions.
19
 In 2010, one observer 
described the market for greenhouse gas offsets as ‘large and rapidly growing,’ although 
forest carbon offsets accounted for a relatively small percentage of the value of all trades.
20
 
 
FRAUDULENT MANIPULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS 
 
As experience with the CAP AEMs demonstrates, the operation of environmental markets 
has the potential to achieve ecosystem protection goals at a lower cost than more traditional 
regulatory techniques. However, these opportunities for efficient environmental protection 
and improvement are accompanied by risks. One such pitfall is that those who generate and 
are paid for credits will not follow through with their commitments. Another risk is that such 
persons would merely implement environment risk reduction measures that do not provide 
the same levels of environmental service as those that are developed through transactions in 
the appropriate market.
21
 Additionally, participants in environmental markets may engage in 
market manipulation or outright fraud. Such illegal conduct thwarts the goals of the particular 
regulatory programmes to which ecosystem markets are attached, and undercuts the 
legitimacy of markets in ecosystem services. For example, market participants who claim to 
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have generated tradable credits may seek to be paid for environmental protections and 
improvements that would have occurred even without the sale of credits if, for example, these 
results are required independently by other regulatory programmes (creating an 
‘additionality’ problem).22 Participants may seek payment for improvements for which they 
have already been compensated (‘double-dipping’). Participants may even attempt to claim 
credit for improvements or protections that never occurred (‘paper’ or ‘phantom’ trade 
transactions).
23
 Trading programmes are problematic because they ‘create strong incentives 
to manipulate the numbers and cheat, because credits that are fraudulently created are still 
worth money’.24 Described below are three examples of environmental markets gone bad, 
each of which involved egregious manipulation of the currencies and systems created by the 
trading programmes. 
 
The first example relates to the EU’s flagship environmental permit trading programme, the 
EU ETS, which, despite relative success, has faced serious questions relating to fraud, such as 
the introduction into the market of recycled trading permits and tax fraud. In an attempt to 
raise revenue, early in 2010 the Hungarian government sold permits known as Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs), which had been issued under the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM and 
had already been surrendered by companies to meet their ETS compliance requirements. The 
government claimed that it sold the credits on the condition that they must not be resold in 
the EU ETS. However, ten trading houses found they had some of them in their accounts 
after they bought CERs on the Paris-based trading exchange BlueNext. The news disrupted 
the carbon market, as ETS exchanges ascertained if their own inventories contained the 
offending instruments. At least three exchanges reacted by temporarily ceasing all trade in 
CERs. The European Commission moved to safeguard the ETS by subsequently banning 
such reuse, but how the credits came to be sold on BlueNext remains unclear.
25
 
 
Tax fraud is another challenge that the ETS has faced. Despite receiving widespread attention 
recently, fraudulent activity has been a problem for the ETS since 2008.
26
 Of initial concern 
was value-added tax (VAT) fraud. In some European countries governments treat carbon 
permits as a taxable consumptive good, with those governments placing a VAT on the 
transfer of carbon credits. Criminals exploited the tax-code variation among countries by 
opening trading accounts, buying permits in countries without a tax, and then selling them in 
countries with a tax. The repeated buying and selling of the permits generated large amounts 
of money from the VAT that disappeared before the VAT was collected. It has been 
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estimated that in 2009, EU Member States lost a combined total in excess of €5 billion 
(Germany is reported to have lost €850 million; the Netherlands €300 million).27 
 
The problem of recycled trading permits and tax fraud has emerged in the EU ETS 
principally because there were no systems designed into the operations of the trading regime 
for prompt EU-wide exchange of information, performance and transparency standards 
coupled with stringent financial fidelity rules. Participants in the Hungarian CER scheme 
were therefore able to shift and dump their holdings into BlueNext without alarm being raised 
promptly. Similarly, the lack of information sharing allowed the variations in tax-code 
frameworks that ultimately allowed VAT-based fraud to thrive. The fact that it took several 
years before this situation was arrested attests to the lack of robust operational standards 
designed to tackle fraud and manipulation in the ETS. 
 
The perverse operation of environmental markets is also exhibited by the Kyoto Protocol’s 
CDM. The carbon credits available under the CDM are valued according to the impact on 
global warming and the staying power in the atmosphere of particular greenhouse gases once 
they are emitted into the environment. Methane (CH4), for example, is 21 times more 
powerful an agent of atmospheric warming than CO2.
28
 The warming potential of nitrous 
oxide (N2O) is 298 times greater than that for CO2.
29 
The chemical HFC-23, a byproduct of 
manufacturing of HCFC-22 (a refrigerant and feedstock for certain plastic products), is 
11,700 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than CO2.
30
 Between the initiation of the 
trading programme and mid-2012, 46% of all credits were awarded to coolant factories, 
mostly in developing countries.
31
 These companies realized that they could generate 11,700 
times as many credits by destroying a tonne of HFC-23 than by capturing a tonne of CO2. 
Companies responded by producing enormous volumes of HCFC-22 so that they could 
generate credits by destroying (very cheaply) the HFC-23 that is its waste byproduct. Some 
of the companies generating CDM credits from the capture of HFC-23 earned nearly twice as 
much (an average of US$20-40 million each year) from the sale of credits as from the 
production of HCFC-22.
32
 Indeed, many of the plants operated only until they had produced 
(and destroyed) the maximum amount of HFC-23 eligible for credits and then shut down 
operations until the following year.
33
 Companies went out of their way to use inefficient 
manufacturing processes to maximize the production of coolant gases and waste HFC-23.
34
 
In 2012, EU regulators caught on to the scheme and declared that it would no longer accept 
CDM credits for the destruction of HFC-23.
35
 The United Nations (UN) refused to award 
credits to any factories that were not already in the business of producing HCFC-22, or that 
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expanded production of the coolant.
36
 In China, some companies who were no longer able to 
earn credits for destroying HFC-23 have resorted to venting it into the atmosphere.
37
 
 
Clearly, the lack of verifiable performance standards in the CDM provided an incentive to 
unnecessarily increase the production of HCFC-22. The absence of a verification framework 
that calibrated the destruction of HFC-23 with particular projects created the space for fraud. 
As Michael Wara puts it, ‘[t]he economics of HFC-23 projects create incentives for strategic 
behavior that, if left unchecked, would undermine the environmental efficacy of the CDM’.38 
Had robust performance standards been incorporated into the scheme right from the start, it 
would not have taken the EU and the UN as long as it took to catch on this scheme that 
almost destroyed the CDM. The case also highlights the lack (and importance) of rule of law 
safeguards that are designed for particular trading regimes. Whilst the design of the CDM 
assumes a functional level of rule of law standards relating to trade in financial and similar 
instruments, the various cases of manipulation in relation to the CDM demonstrated that this 
assumption cannot be taken for granted. 
 
The third example is the Polish biodiesel fraud highlighted at the beginning of this article. 
The case relates to the national renewable energy action plans set up under RED and FQD; 
and which create a sustainability regime for biofuels including the criteria for fuel traders and 
a framework for monitoring by the EU Commission. Under the FQD, the national renewable 
energy action plans must ensure that fuel suppliers reduce fuel greenhouse gas emission 
intensity by 10% by 2020 through improvements in efficiency in the fossil fuel chain, 
increased use of biofuels, and, among other measures, the development of alternative and less 
carbon-intensive power trains. It is under this mandate that Poland has passed a number of 
regulations under the Fuel Quality Monitoring and Control Act (FQM).
39
 These regulations 
set the standards for the blending of hydrocarbon fuels, including diesel, with biomass-based 
liquid biofuels. In contravention of the standards required by the FQM and the Market Abuse 
Regulation,
40
 a number of Polish biodiesel traders were simply adding extra diesel to the 
volumes intended for blending and then subsequently shipping these volumes into the 
domestic and other EU markets as biodiesel. 
 
This case demonstrates the risks posed by the absence of stringent regulatory oversight, a 
lack of transparency standards and the absence of verifiable performance standards. Indeed, 
the EBB speculates that this clearly fraudulent behaviour is due to weak licensing and 
oversight by the Polish authorities.
41
 The omission to require these standards under the RED 
and FQD has put at risk the integrity of the whole environmental services market in biodiesel. 
 
It is impossible to know how many other cases of defrauding and manipulation of 
environmental credit trading markets have yet to be discovered. However, these three 
cautionary tales illustrate the need for building operational safeguards into programmes that 
create environmental markets. Meaningful safeguards will protect against abuses that 
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undercut environmental protection goals and allow participants to reap undeserved profits 
within the operation of markets for ecosystem services. 
 
The preceding cases demonstrate the importance of stringent operational standards, including 
informational safeguards, transparency standards, rule of law safeguards, verifiable 
performance standards, and financial fidelity rules, in ensuring the efficacy of environmental 
markets. In the next section, the article unpacks this set of operational safeguards and argues 
that each one is indispensable to a well-functioning and accountable market in ecosystem 
services. 
 
PREREQUISITES FOR A WELL-FUNCTIONING ENVIRONMENTAL MARKET 
 
Any viable environmental markets must have a number of baseline institutional 
prerequisites.
42
 These include a clear allocation of authority to administer the trading 
programme to public entities,
43
 coupled with the provision of adequate funding to such public 
agencies,
44
 a clear framework for the assignment of property rights to foster confidence in the 
security of credit transactions and to avoid conflicting claims to rights attendant to trading 
credits,
45
 and a stable political environment.
46
 
 
However, the cases analysed above demonstrate that these prerequisites alone are not enough 
for well-functioning environmental markets. In addition to these institutional prerequisites, it 
is critical to ensure that they are supported by a set of operational safeguards that ensure 
market integrity. The following sections describe the role of each of these operational 
safeguards in creating an accountable market in ecosystem services that minimizes 
opportunities for fraud and abuse. 
 
INFORMATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
 
Closely related to information and transparency standards is the requirement for competent 
regulatory oversight. Regulatory supervision for markets for ecosystems will likely be 
ineffective if neither the government nor the public are without access to key information. 
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Consequently, regulators must put in place measures, including mandatory reporting, 
inspections and monitoring. The function of these tools is, first, to verify that the ecosystem 
services supposedly being provided by market participants are actually being supplied and, 
second, to verify that the result is effective protection in a manner consistent with statutory or 
regulatory goals.
47
 In this regard, the authors of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
argued that ‘[e]ffective monitoring, assessment, and reporting is a key to success in allocating 
ecosystem services and implementing response options’.48 The information provided by 
monitoring, inspection and reporting can provide feedback on the ongoing success or failure 
of transactions in environmental markets. It allows for mid-course corrections and the 
initiation of enforcement action if regulatory violations or breaches of conditions on project 
approval have occurred.
49
 
 
It is essential that monitoring occurs on at least two levels. First, it needs to ensure that the 
services actually being provided by the sellers match the services that credit buyers were 
excused from delivering. Second, monitoring is needed to check whether individual trades 
and market-based programmes in the aggregate are actually achieving regulatory goals.
50
 
With respect to the first level, it is important to evaluate whether credit sellers are fulfilling 
the commitments that allowed buyers to escape regulatory requirements.
51
 At the second 
level, if ambient monitoring shows that the intended environmental protection benefits of 
trading are not actually being achieved, programme adjustments should ensue.
52
 
 
Reporting requirements for market participants are essential because, as the instances of fraud 
and abuse discussed above indicate profit-motivated buyers and sellers of environmental 
credits have incentives to cheat. Such incentives must necessarily be nullified by regulatory 
oversight.
53
 
 
Within the EU, the Aarhus Convention’s provisions on access to environmental information 
were implemented through Regulation 1367/2006.
54
 This Regulation sets out the basic terms 
and conditions for granting access to environmental information held by or for public 
authorities. It aims to achieve the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination of 
information to the public. Despite this framework, access to information has not been 
uniformly applied across all EU ecosystems market mechanisms. For example, there have 
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been concerns regarding the lack of ETS data availability and transparency, which have 
allowed the multiple resale of permits and VAT fraud to take place. In its defence, the 
Commission has argued that it has taken measures to improve data availability and 
transparency.
55
 It points out that exchanges and other organized trading venues display 
anonymized information about bids, offers, trades and closing prices for market participants, 
and that this information is also available to the general public after a small delay.
56
 
However, this notwithstanding, information relating to over the counter transactions are still, 
in principle, not accessible to other market participants. This has allowed an opening for 
market abuse. 
 
The European Commission argues that the ETS Directive gives it a specific monitoring role 
which is linked, but not limited to, the introduction of auctioning as the main allocation 
method.
57
 The Commission adds that as financial intermediaries and power companies are the 
main participants on the European carbon market, any examination of the level of market 
oversight has to take account of more general legislation relating to both financial and energy 
markets. The former includes the Market Abuse Directive
58
 (which applies to those emission 
allowance derivatives which are regarded as financial instruments and traded on regulated 
markets) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.
59
 Adopted in November 2010, 
the Auctioning Regulation does two things. It establishes a regulatory framework for the 
auctioning of emission allowances in the 2013-2020 trading period,
60
 and it increases 
regulatory oversight by, inter alia, broadening the scope of the Market Abuse and Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directives in the carbon market by extending to auctioning participants 
a number of measures stemming from the Anti-Money Laundering Directive.
61
 However, the 
European Commission’s role is flawed, relying as it does on the Commission policing itself. 
A more elegant solution would be for the Commission to usher in a regulatory oversight 
framework that makes use of third-party verification. This would likely enhance the 
effectiveness of regulatory oversight safeguards, because the self-interest of market 
participants may make self-monitoring suspect. Thus, verification, either by the government 
or by independent third parties, can perform a valuable function in checking abuse.
62
 
 
TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS 
 
Another key limitation is a lack of information and the absence of stringent transparency 
standards. According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, ‘[i]nsufficient participation 
and transparency in planning and decision-making have been major barriers’ to ecosystem 
protection, through market-based mechanisms and otherwise.
63
 Transparent decision making 
and meaningful opportunities for public participation are critical because the interests of 
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traders may not correspond to the broader public interest.
64
 Transparency and public 
participation promote legitimacy by fostering trust in the system.
65
 Opportunities for public 
participation enable opportunities for those managing the trading programme to garner 
information from a diverse array of sources that may assist in identifying which trades (or 
aspects of trades) would best serve regulatory aims. 
 
Within the EU, the principal framework for information and transparency in environmental 
decision-making is founded upon the Aarhus Convention.
66
 As the Convention’s title 
suggests, one of its key pillars is public participation in environmental decision making, an 
obligation that is binding to both signatory States as well as EU institutions.
67
 Under this 
framework, it is clear that the development of environmental markets must be accompanied 
by robust information and transparency systems, or otherwise fail regulatory scrutiny. 
 
The implication of these observations for environmental markets is twofold. Whilst the 
Aarhus Convention structure provides a theoretically robust framework for establishing 
accountability, the complicated nature of ecosystem services, and the instruments chosen to 
realize their value, may work to thwart the realization of Aarhus’ transparency standards and 
ultimately the possibilities for ensuring accountability. Therefore, it is imperative that clear 
information and transparency standards are articulated in order to mitigate the risks arising 
from opaque or non-participatory frameworks. In this regard, the Aarhus Convention 
provides a very good starting point for articulating a regulatory framework that entrenches 
accountability as a key requirement for all environmental governance efforts – including the 
regulation of environmental markets. 
 
Transparency and opportunities for potential market participants and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) to participate are critical at all stages of the process. This includes rule 
development and review of specific trades. Public input at the retail level is particularly 
important because those potentially affected by projects that a trade would enable, are valued 
for the location-specific information they provide that would be difficult for government 
overseers to acquire.
68
 Equally, transparency in the transfer of funds is important. Salzman 
and Ruhl contend that markets can only work if knowledge of their existence is widespread, 
information about individual transactions is available, and mechanisms exist to allow 
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prospective traders to find trading partners and determine the prices at which transactions are 
taking place.
69
 
 
One option for enhancing transparency at the project-level stage is the creation of a registry 
that permits interested members of the public to track transactions.
70
 For example, the 
Ecosystem Marketplace has become a ‘one-stop shop’ for information about markets and 
payment schemes for ecosystem services.
71
 The website is maintained by the Katoomba 
Group, and is designed to provide a comprehensive source of information on environmental 
markets around the world.
72
 
 
RULE OF LAW SAFEGUARDS 
 
Accountability is key to any market-based regulatory framework. All participants in the 
trading regime need to be held accountable for non-compliance with the law. This includes 
the government officials who administer the programmes as well as private individuals who 
invest and seek to gain in the operation of such markets. Rule of law safeguards should 
therefore be built into the operation of ecosystem service markets to establish consequences 
for non-compliance and procedures to impose those sanctions. 
 
Access to the courts should be available to stakeholders, including interested NGOs, to 
challenge the ground rules for the operation of an ecosystem service market. In addition, 
judicial review should be available for agency approval of individual transactions.
73
 The 
statutes and regulations establishing programmes for markets in ecosystem services should 
specify penalties for violating regulatory requirements and contract terms, and authorize the 
government to impose or seek judicial imposition of those penalties. 
 
Available penalties might include bond forfeiture, the withholding of future payments by 
credit buyers, financial penalties, permit suspensions or revocations, injunctions shutting 
down projects or requiring restoration, and even the imposition of criminal sanctions for 
behaviour such as wilful submission of false reports.
74
 Policy makers should consider making 
the entity that purchases credits legally responsible for its seller’s failure to meet performance 
standards or inability to comply with programme requirements. By moving responsibility to a 
third entity, it is possible to ensure that someone other than the government becomes highly 
invested in successful ecosystem protection actions. 
 
The threat of sanction imposition must be meaningful. This requires the adequate financing of 
enforcement agencies, and the independence of government officials from those who would 
profit from avoidance of the rules. A well-functioning market-based programme would 
include an additional safety net by authorizing judicial review of ongoing project 
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implementation, including performance of contract or regulatory requirements at the behest 
of private citizens and public interest groups.
75
 
 
VERIFIABLE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
 
Viable environmental markets must adopt performance standards for activities conducted by 
a credit seller to meet the regulatory obligations of a credit buyer. In this regard, it is critical 
that performance standards underlying market-based programmes are sufficiently clear and 
not so abstract that they become unverifiable. One way of ensuring that performance 
standards do not stifle trade is to utilize Salzman and Ruhl’s distinction between wholesale 
and retail review of environmental trading.
76
 Wholesale review involves the creation of 
general rules governing trades, while retail review applies to individual transactions to ensure 
compliance with those rules and to verify that the promised environmental services are 
actually being provided.
77
 With respect to wholesale review, those structuring an 
environmental trading programme must balance the ability of detailed trading rules to check 
abuses with the tendency of detailed rules to reduce the flexibility of market participants to 
craft, and oversight agencies to approve, innovative arrangements capable of achieving 
desired levels of protection efficiently. At the retail stage, the more extensive the review, the 
greater the probability that regulators will be able to halt fraudulent trades before they occur. 
There is a balance to be achieved, however. Extensive retail review increases transaction 
costs, which may preclude potentially beneficial trades because they are too costly to arrange 
and implement.
78
 
 
FINANCIAL FIDELITY RULES 
 
No market for environmental service scan eliminate the risk of fraud and abuse, nor can it 
exclude well-intentioned participation that falls short of achieving statutory environmental 
protection goals. Therefore, it is crucial that viable environmental markets require those 
participating in the market to provide financial assurances to guard against the possibility of 
project failure.
79
 An additional level of protection may be provided if those responsible for 
administering an ecosystem services trading programme require that funds to be used for 
mitigation be placed in segregated accounts to minimize the risk of diversion of those funds 
for non-authorized uses. Another option is to run alongside these markets robust insurance 
programmes that would compensate for losses in the event of project failure. These measures 
should be applied to bankers and others who have assumed the regulatory obligations of 
credit purchasers. 
 
FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
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The operational safeguards suggested here are not only justified by an analysis of the cases 
discussed above. There is also a strong legal basis for insisting that these standards form part 
of the baseline legal arrangements for all EU environmental markets. In this regard, it is 
worth noting that key principles of international environmental law require that these 
standards are incorporated into any framework that seeks to deliver environmental protection. 
For example, a number of the Rio Declaration’s principles80 would require that markets for 
ecosystems service apply the measures above. Similarly, some of the clearest obligations 
emerge from the Aarhus Convention. The treaty raises the obligations to provide 
transparency and opportunities for public participation in regulatory decision making and 
oversight for all environmental measures. These measures are binding on States and must be 
applied to market-based programmes in a systematic way. 
 
Another very good reason for insisting on these operational safeguards is experience. The 
performance of market-based programmes that appear to have worked well have invariably 
included a number of the safeguards prescribed above. These programmes have experienced 
less episodes of fraud and manipulation than those that have not had any of these safeguards 
directly built into their legal and operational framework.
81
 Examples of such programmes 
include the EU’s CAP land use programme and the US acid rain programme under Title IV 
of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA).
82
 
 
Consequently, dealing effectively with cases of fraud and manipulation requires some effort 
at integrating the safeguards outlined above into the operations of market-based programmes. 
Such an approach is necessary because cases of fraud and manipulation do not neatly 
manifest themselves as failure of one particular safeguard. Often, it is a combination of 
failures that ultimately enables abuse. Therefore, integrating the standards outlined above 
would likely lower the operational risk profile of market-based programmes. It is also critical 
to ensure that the safeguards outlined above are applied together. This reduces the risk that 
one element of operations will incubate some operational vulnerability. Furthermore, 
deliberately designing these safeguards for particular environmental markets seems a more 
effective strategy rather than relying on general provisions. This is because custom-designed 
safeguards will likely address the specific risks attendant to a trading regime which vary from 
one market-based programme to the next. Finally, a cascade of robust operational safeguards 
is a likely catalyst for all-round good regulatory and operational practice throughout the 
functions of any market-based programme. Applying this set of safeguards constantly and 
consistently ensures that risks are minimized at each stage of trading. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
EU frameworks for environmental markets are inadequate because they do not routinely 
prescribe a robust and integrated framework for operational safeguards beyond general 
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institutional baselines. In some cases, this has allowed fraud and manipulation to take root 
and threaten the integrity of the concerned market-based programmes. However, this lack of 
provision presents a greater danger: environmental markets are yet to gain wide acceptance as 
viable regulatory options. Mounting cases of fraud and manipulation may force off the table 
an environmental protection tool which could yet prove very valuable as a method for 
internalizing costs. 
 
To minimize the risk of fraud and manipulation, this article proposes a suite of operational 
safeguards that are drawn from not only the case studies analysed here but also have a strong 
legal and experiential basis. These safeguards address vulnerabilities that have allowed fraud 
and manipulation to take place in the past. It is critical to ensure that these safeguards are 
specially integrated into each market for environmental services, taking into account its 
particular risk profile. Integrated operational safeguards offer a better buffer against those 
that may seek to take advantage of the operations of the market-based programme as opposed 
to general provisions in the legal framework. More importantly, integrated safeguards ensure 
confidence in environmental markets as a viable tool for managing environmental policy. 
 
The prescription of safeguard mechanisms is not a call for over-regulation but rather for an 
adaptive framework that addresses the risks before they emerge and is reactive enough to 
identify problems before they fester. The current European Commission’s approach to 
dealing with cases of fraud and manipulation shows that it is reactive and fails to proactively 
apply lessons learned to new and existing environmental markets. This is not a sufficient 
methodology for a mechanism that will likely play a key role in environmental protection in 
the EU. It is therefore critical to apply an integrated set of standards to all environmental 
markets to ensure that risks from fraud and manipulation are minimized. 
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